The Tata Tea/ULFA Story
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THE ASSAM TEA INDUSTRY TERROR STORYTill the
late 1980s, militants did not interfere with the functioning of the Assam
tea industry, as it was the single largest employer in the state. Even
during the bandhs[5] declared in the state during 1979-85, tea gardens were
exempted, like other essential services.
The first victim of the Assam tea killings was D Choudhury, Assistant
Manager, Ledo Tea Estate, who was hacked to death in February 1989. In
August 1989, Amal Barua, a field clerk of Corramore estate of the Williamson
Magor group was shot dead. In March 1990, a Tata Tea employee, P C Scaria
was gunned down. The April 1990 killing of Assam Frontier Company Chairman
and NRI tycoon Swaraj Paul's brother, Surrinder Paul (Paul), sent panic
signals, as it now became apparent that appropriate measures had to be taken
for the safety of life and property in the gardens. In October 1990, Bodo
gunmen opened fire at a New Year's party at a planter's club, killing a
manager and wounding ten others.
In November 1990, executives of HLL's Doom Dooma Tea
Estates in Assam and their families were airlifted out of the tea
estates, with the help of the Army and the Air Force. HLL had been asked
to pay Rs 35 lakh plus 5% of the net profits of Brooke Bond and Lipton.
HLL refused to pay, and decided to close its business in the area
instead.
Soon after Paul's murder, the ULFA called a meeting of the Assam tea
industry officials, which was attended by representatives from Tata Tea,
Williamson Magor, Warren Tea, and Goodricke. The representatives were
threatened with further killings if they did not pay money to the ULFA.
Most of the companies accepted the ULFA demands. Following this, the
killings reduced substantially during 1991-93, though kidnapping and
extortion continued unabated. |
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Alarmed by the killings and the industry's plight, the Assam
government set up the Assam Tea Plantation Security Force (ATPSF) to protect the
tea estates. The costs of hiring, training, and equipping the forces were borne
by the tea industry. The tea estates were charged Rs 6 lakh per annum to hire
one unit of the ATPSF. However, because of the high expenses, only 95 of the
roughly 800 tea gardens in the state chose to maintain their own security
forces. Also, the ATPPF just could not match the firepower of the militants.
Initially, the tea garden managers made direct cash payments to the militants.
This was soon substituted by a system of paying via the tea garden contractors
who could pay in cash and raise dummy bills on the companies. Exortion rates
varied according to the size and number of gardens. Individual tea estate owners
paid approximately Rs 5 per kg of tea, while larger gardens paid Rs 1-2 per kg.
There was an atmoshpere of terror in the tea gardens, as is evident from the
statement of the wife of a tea planter who said, “You begin to get really afraid
if your husband doesn't return home by 5.30 in the evening.”
Though the companies officially denied it, it was common knowledge that they
were paying the militants. Meanwhile, the murders resumed in 1994. By the end of
2000, over 15 tea management personnel were killed. All along, Tata Tea was
reportedly the only company, which refused to pay the militants despite its own
employees having been killed and kidnapped. ULFA's commander-in-chief Paresh
Barua (Barua) also confirmed that Tata Tea had never paid money to the outfit.
The reasons as to why Tata Tea had been able to avoid making payments to the
militants were rooted deep in a complex maze of events involving the Assam state
government, the central government, the Intelligence Bureau (IB), the Assam
police and Tata Tea itself.
TATA TEA's DEALS WITH THE ULFA AND THE GOVERNMENT
THE UNSOLVED PROBLEM
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION:
ADDITIONAL READINGS & REFERENCES:
[5] A bandh is a forced closure
of public and private businesses, resulting in a curfew-like situation.
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