The US-64 Controversy
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DISTRUST IN TRUSTUnlike the usual practice for
mutual funds, UTI never declared the NAV of US-64 - only the purchase and
sale prices for the units were announced. Analysts remarked that the
practise of not declaring US-64's NAV in the initial years was justified as
the scheme was formulated to attract the small investors into capital
markets. The declaration of NAV at that time would not have been advisable,
as heavy stock market fluctuations resulting in low NAV figures would have
discouraged the investors. This seemed to have led to a mistaken feeling
that the UTI and US-64 were somehow immune to the volatility of the Sensex.
Following the heavy redemption wave, it soon became public knowledge that
the erosion of US-64's reserves was gradual. Internal audit reports of SEBI
regarding US-64 established that there were serious flaws in the management
of funds.
Till the 1980s, the equity component of US-64 never
went beyond 30%. UTI acquired public sector unit (PSU) stocks under the
1992-97 disinvestment program of the union government. Around Rs
6000-7000 crore was invested in scrips such as MTNL, ONGC, IOC, HPCL &
SAIL.
A former UTI executive said, “Every chairman of the UTI wanted to prove
himself by collecting increasingly larger amounts of money to US-64, and
declaring high dividends.” This seemed to have resulted in US-64
forgetting its identity as an income scheme, supposed to provide fixed,
regular returns by primarily investing in debt instruments. |
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Even a typical balanced fund (equal debt and equity)
usually did not put more than 30% of its corpus into equity. A Business
Today report claimed that eager to capitalise on the 1994 stock market boom,
US-64 had recklessly increased its equity holdings. By the late 1990s the
fund's portfolio comprised around 70% equity.
While the equity investments increased by 40%, UTI seemed to have ignored
the risk factor involved with it. Most of the above investments fared very
badly on the bourses, causing huge losses to US-64. The management failed to
offload the equities when the market started declining. While the book value
of US-64's equity portfolio went up from Rs 7,943 crore (June 1994) to Rs
13,627 (June 1998), the market value had actually declined in the same
period from Rs 18,334 crore to Rs 10,029 crore. Analysts remarked that UTI
had been pumping money into scrips whose market value kept falling. Raising
further questions about the fund management practices was the fact that
there were hardly any ‘growth scrips'from the IT and pharma sectors in the
equity portfolio.
In spite of all this, UTI was able to declare dividends as it was paying
them out of its yearly income, its reserves and by selling the stocks that
had appreciated. This kept the problem under wraps till the reserves turned
negative and UTI could no longer afford to keep the sale and purchase prices
artificially inflated.
Following the public outrage against the whole issue, UTI in collaboration
with the government of India began the task of controlling the damage to
US-64's image.
RESTORING THE TRUST
TABLE I HOW THINGS WERE SET RIGHT
DEAD END SCHEME?
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
EXHIBIT I UTI – OBJECTIVES & STRUCTURE
EXHIBIT II DIVIDENDS DECLARED BY US-64
ADDITIONAL READINGS & REFERENCES
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